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Introduction
One of the defining features of Autism Spectrum Disorder 
(ASD) is some level of impairment in social interaction. 
This impairment may be the result of difficulties in inter-
preting or ‘reading’ the verbal and non-verbal social com-
munications of other individuals or in communicating with 
others in ways that accord with normative expectations 
(APA 2013). These impairments have often been attributed 
to a core deficit in Theory of Mind (ToM), a deficit which 
is reflected in a diminished ability to take the perspective of 
others and considered by some to be independent of intel-
lectual level (e.g., Baron-Cohen 1995, 2001; Baron-Cohen 
et  al. 1985). It has been argued that a diminished ability 
to interpret the beliefs, intentions and emotions of others 
will undermine the individual’s ability to interact in ways 
that are generally considered appropriate and adaptive for a 
particular social context. Not all research argues for a ToM 
deficit as the key mechanism underlying the social inter-
action impairments seen in ASD (see, for example, Stone 
and Gerrans 2006; and Van de Cruys et  al. 2014). Also, 
numerous quite specific mechanisms have been examined 
in an attempt to understand the nature and development 
of these social impairments, with deficits in areas such as 
facial and vocal emotion processing, attention, or perhaps 
simply disinclination rather than a deficit, just a few of the 
mechanisms considered (e.g., Globerson et al. 2015; Kold-
ewyn et al. 2013; Kuchinke et al. 2011; Nuske et al. 2013; 
Townsend et al. 1996; Weigelt et al. 2012). To what extent 
such deficits are manifestations of a ToM deficit or possibly 
represent core deficits in their own right are perspectives on 
which researchers likely differ. Disentangling the relative 
contributions of such deficits from those of some more gen-
eral social-cognitive deficit(s) to the way in which an indi-
vidual interprets and responds to social communications 
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from another person is obviously extremely difficult given 
the diverse array of likely co-varying social-communica-
tive cues emitted in any social exchange. Although various 
perspectives have been advanced about the mechanisms 
underlying the social-communicative deficits observed in 
association with ASD, there has been an enduring focus 
on trying to assess the extent and nature of ToM deficien-
cies. We extended prior work by focusing on the develop-
ment and psychometric evaluation of an adaptation (and 
extension) for adults with ASD of what has perhaps been 
the most widely used ToM measure in research into ASD, 
the Strange Stories test (Happé 1994, 1999; Fletcher et al. 
1995). By evaluating the instrument using a large sample of 
adults with ASD and an IQ-matched typically developing 
sample we highlighted the extent and variability of ToM 
deficits in adults with ASD.
Measuring ToM in Adults with ASD
Numerous instruments have been developed to measure 
ToM, or some aspect(s) of ToM, in individuals with ASD, 
although there has been no universally accepted operation-
alization of ToM. Early research in this area, shaped by 
research examining ToM in young typically developing 
children, used variants of the false belief tasks used widely 
in mainstream developmental research (e.g., Baillargeon 
et al. 2010; Baron-Cohen et al. 1985; Bowler 1992; Wim-
mer and Perner 1983). Following the observation that many 
older children and adolescents with ASD could pass such 
tests1–despite their pronounced social impairments being 
suggestive of ToM deficits—researchers developed what 
were considered to be more age-appropriate tests that 
would be sensitive to those social-cognitive deficits that 
characterize older individuals. For example, The Reading 
the Mind in the Eyes Test probes the person’s ability to 
associate a specific mental state descriptor (e.g., flirtatious, 
hostile) with the expression conveyed by an image of a pair 
of eyes (Baron-Cohen et al. 2001). Another test–the Strange 
Stories (Happé 1994)–comprises a number of scenarios or 
stories, presented on pencil-and-paper, in which the exami-
nee is required to explain the meaning of the behavior of 
the key characters within the scenarios when they use 
expressions that mean something other than what a literal 
interpretation of the expression might suggest (e.g., meta-
phors, sarcasm, white lies). Happé’s original instrument 
comprised 24 mental or social stories (i.e., stories requiring 
1 Note, however, various strands of evidence indicating that explicit 
prompting may be required for adults to recognize or track the mental 
states of others rather than it occurring spontaneously (e.g., Schneider 
et al. 2013; Senju et al. 2009).
a reading of the social intent of the characters) and 6 con-
trol stories (i.e., stories not requiring any social inferences). 
When compared with IQ-matched controls, individuals 
with ASD were expected to perform worse on the mental or 
social, but not the control (or what are referred to as the 
physical) stories. Sub-sets of items from the Strange Stories 
test (Fletcher et al. 1995; Happé 1994, 1999) have provided 
the stimuli for many of the other examinations of ToM defi-
cits in both children and adults with ASD.
Various perspectives appear to have motivated the 
design of instruments or tests that have been used with 
adult samples. One perspective has been that ToM defi-
cits in adults may only become apparent when the context 
mirrors the demands of real life social exchanges. Ponnet 
et al. (2008) found that ASD-linked deficits in interpreting 
emotional expressions in actors’ conversations were more 
pronounced when the context was naturalistic and unstruc-
tured rather than highly organized or predictable. This 
finding aligns with observations that differences in social 
attention between ASD and typically developing samples 
only emerged with naturalistic (rather than static) stimuli 
capturing the dynamics of social interactions (Chevallier 
et al. 2015). In a similar vein, Frith (2004) suggested that 
much of the apparent variability in ToM test performance 
that may be seen in adult samples may reflect the extent to 
which the task allows an individual to hack out a solution 
to a problem. Thus, while a person with impaired ToM may 
be able to work out answers when confronted with pencil-
and-paper scenarios, they may experience much greater dif-
ficulty when confronted with the limited time constraints 
that typify an ongoing or live social interaction.
Regardless of the instrument used, however, variability 
in the ToM performance of individuals with ASD has been 
suggested, though there is no robust empirical evidence 
that provides a clear indication as to the extent of such 
variability in adults. There are no data available to show, 
at the group level, how adults with ASD compare with IQ-
matched non-ASD controls, whether some proportion of 
individuals with ASD match the ceiling performance of 
non-ASD controls, what the extent of any overlap between 
ASD and non-ASD samples may be, and so on. Put simply, 
there is a paucity of empirical data on the extent and vari-
ability of ToM deficits in adults with ASD.
Moreover, there are major limitations with existing ToM 
measurement instruments, limitations which not only pro-
vide major challenges for assessing ToM in adults with 
ASD but also constrain our understanding of the extent of 
ToM deficits in adults. A key limitation is that the admin-
istration of the instruments has not been standardized and 
a number of variants of the tests have been used. In the 
absence of a standardized tool used with large sample sizes, 
a close psychometric evaluation that would normally be 
associated with the development of an assessment tool is 
J Autism Dev Disord 
1 3
not possible. There are, of course, a couple of very obvious 
reasons for why this has occurred. First, many of the ToM 
instruments used in research with participants with ASD 
were developed to explore hypotheses about the nature of 
deficits in ASD rather than to provide a formal assessment 
device akin to an intelligence or personality test. Conse-
quently, a probing psychometric analysis was not on the 
test developers’ agendas. Second, researchers generally 
find it extremely difficult to access the number of individu-
als with ASD that would make such a psychometric exer-
cise viable. Consequently, reliable normative data are non-
existent. These gaps in the existing literature motivated our 
adaptation, extension and evaluation of the Strange Stories 
test (Happé 1994, 1999).
The A‑ToM
The current study was designed to address these limita-
tions using the A-ToM (Adult-Theory of Mind), which is an 
adaptation and extension of the Strange Stories test. In the 
following section we outline the steps taken in this study to 
extend the pioneering work involving the Strange Stories in 
order to provide a robust ToM assessment instrument for 
adults with ASD and provide an indication of the extent 
and variability of ToM deficits in adults with ASD. There 
were several main objectives underpinning the develop-
ment and evaluation of the instrument. The first objective 
was to develop a set of test items, each of which involved 
participants responding to a brief video depicting actors 
engaged in a naturalistic interpersonal interaction. To simu-
late the demands imposed by many day-to-day social inter-
actions, participants had to respond to the question posed 
about each item within 1  min, a constraint which limited 
their opportunity to hack out a solution to the items (as 
may happen when there is an opportunity to re-study a 
pencil-and-paper scenario). A tool that does not provide an 
opportunity for a person to routinely follow rules or hack 
out solutions, but requires the monitoring of the unfolding 
of relationships between characters and the understand-
ing of other subtle social nuances, should provide a more 
complete understanding of a person’s impairment in this 
domain.
Our presentation format offers two other potentially 
important advantages. From a testing and diagnostic per-
spective, the responses to the video scenarios offer a valu-
able starting point for discussions between clinicians and 
clients about their (mis)understanding of social cues and 
situations, with such scenarios almost certainly having 
greater face validity from a client’s perspective than pen-
cil-and-paper equivalents. The formal identification of sig-
nificant deficits in this area may highlight factors that may 
be constraining the development of effective interpersonal 
relationships, undermining the individual’s adaptation to 
the demands of their employment situation, or even con-
tributing to risk for naïve involvement in criminal behav-
ior or maladaptive interactions with criminal justice system 
professionals (cf. Brewer and Young 2015). And, from a 
research perspective, such scenarios would allow for the 
recording of measures such as eye movements (cf. Senju 
et al. 2009) and reaction time that may be informative about 
underlying psychological processes. Other researchers have 
examined ToM measures that required participants to make 
social-cognitive inferences about interactions observed in 
short video vignettes or longer movies. Two examples of 
such tests that have been used with individuals with ASD 
are the Awkward Moments Test (Heavey et  al. 2000) and 
the MASC (Movie for the Assessment of Social Cogni-
tion, Dziobek et  al. 2006). Although both instruments 
showed promise in discriminating adults with ASD from 
control participants, the sample sizes were so small (<20 
per group) that it was obviously not possible to conduct a 
detailed psychometric evaluation of the instruments or to 
assess the reliability of the its correlations with other rel-
evant measures.
Consistent with the Strange Stories test, some A-ToM 
items required participants to draw mental, or social, infer-
ences, while others were physical items. The former should 
differentiate individuals with ASD from typically develop-
ing individuals while the latter should not. Thirteen of the 
total pool of 17 items evaluated were based on the original 
Happé (1999) Strange Stories items2 although, for some 
items, the content had to be modified to adapt the item from 
a pencil-and-paper format to video or digital presentation. 
A further four social items were developed for this study. 
The eight physical (control) items were based on the items 
developed by Fletcher et al. (1995) and fully described by 
Happé (1999). Although all participants provided data for 
all of these items, our aim was to use the psychometric data 
to reduce the set of items to a more manageable size (while 
maintaining sensitivity) which would allow test administra-
tion within no more than 30 min. Decisions about appropri-
ate test length and administration duration are obviously 
somewhat arbitrary. However, our research and clinical 
experience suggested that use of the instrument in either of 
those contexts would be more likely if administration could 
be effected in 20–30 min. Given the stimuli and the maxi-
mum permitted response times, the final test would, there-
fore, contain in the vicinity of 10–15 items.
The second objective was to evaluate the instrument 
with large samples of (performance) IQ-matched ASD and 
typically developing adults of average or above-average 
intelligence (i.e., IQ ≥ 85). A number of published studies 
2 The Acknowledgments section contains full details on permissions.
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involving adults with ASD have used subsets of the 24 
items published by Happé (1994), sometimes adapted or 
translated (e.g., Happé 1994; Happé et  al. 1996; Heavey 
et  al. 2000; Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen 1999; Ponnet et  al. 
2004; Roeyers et al. 2001; White et al. 2009). Sample sizes 
for ASD participants in these studies ranged from 5 to 24, 
with the total number of participants with ASD numbering 
139. Note, however, that the total number would have been 
even lower if some samples had not included some individ-
uals with ages less than 16 years (e.g., Happé 1994) or IQs 
below 85 (e.g., Happé 1994; Heavey et  al. 2000; Roeyers 
et al. 2001). The IQ-matched control samples in the above 
studies were of similar size to the ASD samples. In order to 
provide more reliable normative data (although we realized 
that we would obviously not have sufficiently large samples 
to be able to produce specific age norms across the adult 
years), our approach to participant recruitment in this study 
targeted 120–200 participants with ASD and 75–100 typi-
cally developing control participants. Ideally the two sam-
ples would be matched on performance IQ. We acknowl-
edge that persons with ASD have unique cognitive profiles 
and matching with typical controls is difficult; thus, the use 
of scales such as the Wechsler Scales is preferred as it taps 
the diversity in abilities (cf. Mottron 2004). Although there 
is no standard rule for matching, the purpose of the match-
ing should be considered as should the tasks being under-
taken. Performance IQ was our preferred match as it is less 
affected by the verbal demands of the test and thus thought 
to be a purer reflection of IQ. If our final samples proved to 
be closely matched on performance IQ, we would be able 
to control for any verbal IQ differences between the two 
samples in statistical analyses. We excluded participants 
with IQ below 85 to facilitate a neater distinction between 
ToM deficits (despite the matching) and cognitive process-
ing limitations often observed in association with border-
line and lower intellectual functioning.
The third objective incorporated two components. One 
component involved an examination of individual items in 
order to refine the pool of items based on a combination 
of item difficulty with item discrimination index and item-
total correlation coefficients. The other involved an assess-
ment of inter-rater and test–retest reliability.
The fourth objective was to explore the validity of the 
A-ToM. First, principal components analyses (PCA) were 
conducted to explore the components underlying A-ToM 
performance. Second, we conducted the comparison of 
performance differences between the ASD and non-ASD 
samples on the social and physical tests of the A-ToM. Cru-
cially, as Happé and colleagues have argued (e.g., Happé 
1994; Fletcher et  al. 1995), the ASD sample should per-
form significantly worse than IQ-matched controls on the 
social but not the physical items. Third, we examined the 
relationship between A-ToM performance and performance 
on two measures that we expected should clearly discrimi-
nate ASD and non-ASD samples, yet did not involve any 
assessment of ToM abilities. One instrument included three 
sub-scales from the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis 
1983), each of which is a self-report scale tapping a par-
ticular aspect of empathy (i.e., perspective taking, empathic 
concern, and personal distress). The other was the mini-
SPIN, a measure used to screen for generalized social anxi-
ety disorder (Connor et  al. 2001). Fourth, we examined 
convergent validity of the A-ToM via the correlation of test 
performance with two other published ToM measures, the 
Strange Stories and the Frith- Happé animations (White 
et al. 2011).
As noted earlier in this paper there has been limited 
research into ToM deficits in adults with ASD, with the 
size of the samples making it extremely difficult to evaluate 
the likely extent and variability of ToM deficits in adults. 
The net effect of realizing the four objectives for the assess-
ment instrument described above was to provide an indi-
cation–based on a much larger sample of individuals with 
ASD than has been reported in previous research–of the 
extent and variability of ToM deficits in adults with ASD 
when compared with a typically developing sample.
Method
Participants
The ASD sample comprised 163 individuals (50 female) 
with a diagnosis of Asperger syndrome (AS) or ASD. 
Their ages ranged from 16 to 62  years (M = 27.0  years, 
SD = 11.8  years). Scores on the Perceptual Reasoning 
Index (PRI) and the Verbal Comprehension Index (VCI) 
of the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence-Second 
Edition (WASI-II; Wechsler 2011) ranged from 86 to 147 
(M = 108.7, SD = 13.5, 95% CI [106.6, 110.7]) and 64–149 
(M = 103.0, SD = 15.0, 95% CI [100.7, 105.3], respectively.
All but 12 participants were registered with the local 
agency that coordinates statewide assessment and provision 
of services. All individuals registered with the local agency 
had been diagnosed by two qualified diagnosticians and 
met DSM-IV-TR [APA 2000] criteria. The other 12 partici-
pants were diagnosed either by a psychologist recognized 
by the local agency or by two qualified diagnosticians. The 
individuals also met clinical cut-off scores for AS using 
either the Autism Diagnostic Interview—Revised (Lord 
et al. 1994), Gillberg and Gillberg’s criteria (Gillberg and 
Gillberg 1989), or the Childhood Asperger Syndrome Test 
(Scott et al. 2002). Participants were recruited in three main 
ways: (1) They had participated in previous psychological 
studies and volunteered to consider participating in future 
studies. (2) They responded to a flyer at a local clinical 
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practice specializing in ASD. (3) They responded to a flyer 
circulated by the local autism agency (N = 150). The flyer 
described the study and its requirements and how to make 
contact with the researchers. Participants were paid $120 
for their participation and were tested on-campus, in their 
own home or in a local community facility such as a library. 
Data collection spanned a 34-month period with the objec-
tive being to gather as large a sample as possible, but hope-
fully between 120 and 200 adults to provide an adequately 
powered set of group contrasts. An additional 32 individu-
als completed all assessments but were not included in this 
study because they recorded a PRI on the WASI-II of less 
than 85. Given (a) the costs associated with the lengthy 
testing sessions and (b) our pilot testing of the A-ToM in 
class practical sessions indicated that a smaller sample of 
non-ASD individuals should deliver stable data, we only 
targeted 75–100 non-ASD participants. The final sample 
included 80 typically developing individuals (56 female) 
who had added their contact details to a register of indi-
viduals registered for participation in psychology studies, 
or elected to participate for course credit. Their ages ranged 
from 17 to 59  years (M = 26.1  years, SD = 10.2  years). 
Scores on the PRI and the VCI ranged from 86 to 136 
(M = 106.4, SD = 12.1, 95% CI [103.7, 109.0]) and 82–160 
(M = 111.2, SD = 13.9, 95% CI [108.2, 114.3], respectively. 
Most were undergraduate students or were enrolled in pro-
grams designed to facilitate transition to university study 
for mature-aged students. To increase the likelihood that we 
might achieve an approximate IQ match for the ASD and 
non-ASD samples, we tried to avoid recruiting potential 
participants who were enrolled in elite undergraduate pro-
grams or at advanced stages of study. A further 20 potential 
control participants were tested but excluded because their 
AQ-10 score (Allison et al. 2012) exceeded 6 (n = 7), their 
WASI-II Perceptual Reasoning Index (PRI), was below 85 
(n = 4), they had an immediate family member with a diag-
nosis of ASD (n = 5), or English was their second language 
(n = 4).
The two groups proved to be nicely matched on the 
PRI, t (241) = 1.28, p = 20, d = 0.18, 95% CI [-0.09, 0.44], 
but the ASD group was significantly lower on the VCI, 
t (241) = 4.15, p < .001, d = 0.57, 95% CI [0.29, 0.84]. 
Accordingly, the VCI was used as a covariate in analyses.
Materials
A-ToM. There were two separate sub-tests of items: one 
comprised 17 social items and the other included 8 physical 
items. The social items included 13 items based on items 
from Happé (1994, 1999) and 4 items developed for this 
study. These 4 items were developed by the second author 
and stimulated by observations of apparent sources of diffi-
culties experienced and articulated by clients encountered 
in day-to-day clinical practice. The items evolved from dis-
cussions with clients who had shared their social mishaps 
and faux pas in a group setting. Supplementary Materials 
Table 1 shows the script for all social and physical items. 
Items 2, 3, 6 and 10 are the new items and they include two 
faux pas and two sarcasm items. The other items were 
adapted from Happé’s items and included items from cate-
gories such as lie, white lie, misunderstanding, double 
bluff, irony, figure of speech, joke, pretend and persuasion. 
The 8 physical items were based on those used by Fletcher 
et al. (1995) and described in Happé (1999). A script was 
written for each item and the items were then acted out and 
professionally filmed in order to produce a high quality set 
of digital stimuli. The scenarios ranged in duration from 14 
to 108 s. The six social and six physical items3 that com-
prised the final scale (after the psychometric analyses) can 
be accessed via the link below:
Physical Playlist Link: https://www.youtube.com/playlist
?list=PLJCW1evzKKcuy1rGu3Ocatm97s_KpdhyI.
Social Playlist Link: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?l
ist=PLJCW1evzKKctzHvYfB1RADd27m8IBaWcu.
The 25 scenarios were incorporated into a VLC Media 
Player playlist in a random order. Four different randomly-
ordered versions were created for counterbalancing pur-
poses, with social and physical videos distributed randomly 
throughout each version. The questions relating to each 
scenario were displayed on screen following the video, and 
participants were provided with a response sheet to write 
down their responses. For questions that had two compo-
nents (i.e., Is this true? Why did she say this?), participants 
were provided with a ‘Yes/No’ response in addition to the 
blank writing space that was provided for all other ques-
tions. Participants were instructed at the beginning of the 
task that they would have 60  s in which to record their 
response for each question. The test administrator started a 
timer when the question appeared on the screen and, if the 
timer went off before the participant had finished answer-
ing, they were instructed to stop writing. Selection of this 
interval was based on a pilot study in which we group-
tested 25 upper-level psychology students, recording the 
time it took for most of the group to complete their 
response to each question. Participants’ answers were rated 
on a 0–2 scale: 0 (incorrect), 1 (partially correct) or 2 (cor-
rect), with the scoring criteria providing examples for each 
3 In the final set of scenarios some actors overlap in some scenes. 
Whether participants’ overall performance was facilitated (through 
repetition) or impaired (because those particular actors were ‘harder 
to read’) by this overlap is impossible to determine.
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answer type provided for each item (see Supplementary 
Materials Table 2 for scoring criteria).4
IQ Control
Participants were administered the four subtests of the 
WASI-II: Block Design, Vocabulary, Matrix Reasoning, 
and Similarities. The Block Design and Matrix Reasoning 
subtests make up the Perceptual Reasoning component, 
while the Vocabulary and Similarities subtests make up 
the Verbal Comprehension component. Composite scores 
are calculated from these to create a Perceptual Reasoning 
Index (PRI), a Verbal Comprehension Index (VCI), and a 
Full Scale Intelligence Quotient. Reliability and validity 
data are reported in McCrimmon & Smith (2012).
4 It is possible that group differences in performance were influenced 
by factors such as the requirement to provide written (rather than 
verbal) responses or having to draw the appropriate social inferences 
from short rather than long duration video clips.
Discriminant Validity Measures
The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (see Davis 1983, for 
reliability and construct validity data) comprises four 
seven-item, self-report sub-scales which tap four different 
aspects of empathy. We used three of the four scales which 
measured the extent to which individuals self-reported (a) 
taking the psychological perspective of others (i.e., per-
spective taking), (b) showing concern for others in dif-
ficulty (i.e., empathic concern), and (c) feeling disquiet 
about tense interactions with others (i.e., personal distress). 
Participants read a series of statements and rated to what 
extent they believed the statement described them (0 = does 
not describe me well; 4 = describes me very well), and 
received a score out of 28 for each subscale.
The Mini-SPIN–based on an item analysis of the Social 
Phobia Inventory (see Connor et al. 2001, for psychometric 
data)–is a three item, self-report screener for generalized 
social anxiety disorder. Participants read three statements 
and were asked to rate to what extent the statements applied 
to them (0 = not at all; 4 = extremely), thus receiving a score 
Table 1  Proportion correct 
 (PC), item discrimination index 
(D), and item-total correlation 
coefficients for ASD and non-
ASD control samples on A-ToM 
social and physical items
*Bolded items denote the final pool of items
Social items ASD Non-ASD
PC D Item-total PC D Item-total
Bunnies* 0.50 70.7 0.47 0.62 62.1 0.12
Party 0.77 48.2 0.51 0.93 30.8 0.54
Crying man 0.74 69.0 0.58 0.87 34.8 0.43
Burglar 0.24 47.4 0.45 0.40 32.5 0.19
Hat 0.76 40.6 0.36 0.93 23.1 0.46
Spaghetti 0.63 60.9 0.38 0.83 50.1 0.41
Chocolate 0.57 63.3 0.38 0.75 38.8 0.05
Xmas present 0.65 45.8 0.25 0.85 0.6 −0.02
Dinner 0.68 76.7 0.62 0.77 23.7 0.02
Pregnancy 0.87 28.0 0.35 0.97 15.4 0.35
Walking home 0.42 38.3 0.26 0.47 39.9 0.24
Sausages 0.25 50.8 0.38 0.31 55.6 0.37
Alibi 0.22 50.0 0.27 0.17 21.9 0.06
Cough 0.71 63.9 0.37 0.77 31.4 0.27
Dog 0.26 28.9 0.26 0.22 21.9 0.02
Banana 0.50 58.4 0.31 0.50 55.0 0.17
Vase 0.90 28.2 0.32 0.92 30.8 0.32
Physical Items
 Light bulbs 0.59 48.2 0.25 0.70 42.0 0.20
 Swimming 0.46 85.5 0.32 0.51 75.7 0.29
 Glasses 0.61 65.4 0.31 0.71 54.3 0.24
 Car 0.35 67.6 0.33 0.61 47.0 0.28
 Leg injury 0.82 38.3 0.33 0.76 34.0 0.26
 Librarian 0.44 73.6 0.34 0.38 51.3 0.10
 Burglar alarm 0.92 20.5 0.25 0.91 16.3 0.01
 Mayonnaise 0.80 42.9 0.34 0.93 −8.0 −0.20
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from 0 to 12. Although the items on both the Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index and the Mini-Spin (e.g., “I sometimes try 
to understand my friends better by imagining how things 
look from their perspective” or “I often have tender, con-
cerned feelings for people less fortunate than me,” Davis 
1983, or “Fear of embarrassment causes me to avoid doing 
things or speaking to people; ”Connor et  al. 2001) seem 
likely to distinguish ASD and non-ASD samples, they do 
not appear to involve the type of social-cognitive reasoning 
associated with reading the subtleties of an unfolding social 
interaction.
Convergent Validity Measures
The two measures used were the Strange Stories test and 
the Frith-Happé animations (White et  al. 2011). Many 
adaptations of the Strange Stories test have been reported 
in the literature. We used the eight social and eight physical 
stories listed in Happé (1999) and used by Fletcher et  al. 
(1995). Two versions, with either the eight physical stories 
first or the eight social stories first, were alternated across 
participants. Participants read the story and then answered 
the appropriate question; there was no time limit within 
which participants had to respond. Participants’ answers 
were rated on a 0–2 scale: 0 (incorrect), 1 (partially correct) 
or 2 (correct).
The other convergent validity measure was a (slightly) 
modified version of White et al.’s (2011) task which used 
what are commonly referred to as Frith and Happé’s (Abell 
et  al. 2000) animations. The 14 videos from the original 
study were put together in a NeuroBehavioural Systems 
Presentation file: 2 practice videos, 4 ToM (i.e., social or 
mental) videos, 4 goal-directed (physical) videos, and 
4 random videos, and were played in a random order for 
each participant. Following White et al. (2011), after see-
ing each video participants viewed a screen that asked them 
to categorize the behavior displayed by the triangles in the 
video as indicating either a mental interaction, physical 
interaction, or no interaction by selecting the correspond-
ing numbers on the keyboard. Participants first completed 
two practice trials, for which they received feedback on 
their responses, and were able to read the definitions of the 
interaction types while they were answering. No feedback 
was provided on further responses. For mental interaction 
videos, participants were also asked to select from a list 
of words the word that best described how each of the tri-
angles were feeling at the end of the video (one question 
about the feelings of the large triangle, one question about 
the feelings of the small triangle, with responses giving rise 
to a feelings categorization score). These additional ques-
tions only appeared if the participant had correctly catego-
rized the video as mental; if they were incorrect, they did 
not receive these questions. Participants received 1 point 
for correct answers. A score out of 4 was received for cor-
rect categorization of each of the 3 types of videos (men-
tal, physical and random); a score out of 8 was received 
for correctly identifying the feelings of the triangles in the 
mental videos; and a total score of 12 was possible for cor-
rect categorization of all video types. White et  al. (2011) 
found that adults with ASD were less effective than age and 
IQ-matched controls at identifying mental state interactions 
and categorizing emotions.
Other Measures
Participants in the ASD sample also completed several 
other measures: the DASS-21 (Lovibond and Lovibond 
1995), the AQ50 (ASD participants; Baron-Cohen et  al. 
2001), and a questionnaire probing the nature and intensity 
of any restricted interests or preoccupations. These meas-
ures were used for screening purposes for a completely 
different research project and were interposed as fillers to 
maximize the interval between the A-ToM and the Strange 
Stories. The non-ASD participants completed the AQ-10 
(Allison et al. 2012).
Procedure
Details of the study were explained to participants and they 
read a letter of introduction and gave consent. They first 
provided details about their age, gender, language, ASD 
diagnosis, and family ASD diagnosis. Tests were adminis-
tered in the following order: A-ToM (or Strange Stories), 
Frith-Happé animations, WASI-II, Mini-SPIN, Interper-
sonal Reactivity Index, DASS-21, AQ50, restricted inter-
ests questionnaire, and Strange Stories (or A-ToM). The 
presentation order of the A-ToM and Strange Stories was 
counterbalanced.
Depending on the individual participant’s access to 
transport, testing took place at the university, in a local 
community library or hall, or in the participant’s home. 
Testing sites were all within a radius of 120 km of the uni-
versity. For off-campus testing, the test administrator was 
accompanied by an upper-level psychology student. There 
were two test administrators, both of whom had completed 
honors level studies in psychology. Participants were told 
they could take breaks when needed during the session. 
Session durations ranged from 2.5 to 4 h.
Inter-Rater Reliability and Test–Retest Stability
To assess inter-rater reliability for the A-ToM and the 
Strange Stories, two observers (blind to participant’s group) 
studied, and practiced with, the scoring protocols and, 
after training, scored 30% (N = 73) of the response sheets. 
To examine stability of the A-ToM, 40 individuals were 
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retested by one of the two administrators at intervals rang-
ing from 2 to 83 weeks (M = 23.7 weeks, SD = 23.4 weeks).
Results
Item Analysis
Our first objective was to conduct an item analysis with a 
view to reducing the pool of items to a discriminating sub-
set that would be more manageable from a test administra-
tion perspective yet still provide adequate coverage of the 
content domains (e.g., 10–15 items). Table  1 shows the 
item difficulty (i.e., the proportion of participants in each 
group who provided the correct response for each item), 
the item discrimination index (i.e., the proportion of par-
ticipants in the highest-scoring 25% of each group who 
answered the item correctly minus the proportion of par-
ticipants in the lowest-scoring 25% of each group who 
answered the item correctly), and the item-total correla-
tion coefficient for each of the 25 social and physical items 
(which provides additional information about the variabil-
ity explained in test scores).
We first identified social items on which the ASD sam-
ple were obviously inferior to the controls. Using a crite-
rion of proportion correct for the ASD sample being more 
than 0.10 below that for the non-ASD sample, we reduced 
the pool of social items to eight. Although item difficulty 
might desirably cluster around 0.5 it was clear that there 
were (a) few items for which this held for the ASD sam-
ple and (b) a number of items on which (quite predictably) 
the non-ASD sample was close to ceiling. For these eight 
remaining items our criteria were (a) the proportion correct 
for the ASD sample should lie between 0.25 and 0.75 (or 
very close to those boundaries if it allowed us to retain an 
item), and (b) the item-total correlation for the ASD sam-
ple should exceed 0.20 (range = 0.25–0.58), and the item 
should be clearly more difficult (i.e., the item discrimina-
tion index) for the low-scoring than the high-scoring exam-
inees. Given that for two of these eight items, the item-total 
correlation for non-ASD participants did not even reach 
0.10, we reduced the item pool for social items to six, with 
these being the items bolded in Table 1. The final six items 
included examples of faux pas (1), sarcasm (2), white lie 
(1), bluff or persuasion (1) and perspective taking or mis-
understanding (1). Three of these six items were based on, 
or adapted from, items described in Happé (1999), and the 
other three items were from the pool developed for this 
study.
To produce an equivalent number of physical items, 
we simply excluded the two items for which the item-total 
coefficients failed to reach 0.10. For the ASD-sample, this 
meant that proportion correct for one of these items clearly 
exceeded our desired cut-off of 0.75. All physical items 
were based on, or adapted from, items described in Happé 
(1999). Importantly, the outcome of the reduction of the 
item pool was such that the social items did not emerge as 
significantly more difficult overall than the physical items 
(contrary to what Fletcher et  al. 1995, had found for the 
original Strange Stories physical items) for either the ASD 
sample (M = 0.61, SD = 0.21 vs. M = 0.55, SD = 0.16), t 
(10) = 0.57, p = .58, or the non-ASD controls (M = 0.76, 
SD = 0.21 vs. M = 0.61, SD = 0.14), t (10) = 1.45, p = .18.
Reliability
Inter-rater reliability, using Cohen’s kappa, was 0.77 for the 
6-item A-ToM social scale and 0.88 for the 6-item A-ToM 
physical scale. The corresponding values for the Strange 
Stories’ scales were 0.80 and 0.81. Test retest coefficients 




A principal components analysis (PCA) was conducted on 
the 12 A-ToM items (6 social, 6 physical) using all 243 par-
ticipants. A Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measure (KMO = 0.82) 
exceeding 0.6 (Tabachnick and Fidell 2001) and Bartlett’s 
Test of Sphericity, χ2 (66) = 364.7, p < .001, respectively, 
confirmed the adequacy of the sample size and the correla-
tions between items. Given the likelihood of psychological 
constructs being strongly correlated, we used an oblique 
rotation, direct oblimin (delta = 0) following Fabrigar, 
Wegener, MacCallum, and Strahan (1999). The criteria 
for determining the retention of components combined the 
Kaiser criterion (eigenvalues > 1.0), the Cattell scree test 
(for discontinuities in the plot of the eigenvalues), paral-
lel analysis, simple structure and interpretability. A score 
above 0.32 on a primary loading of items after rotation 
was used as the cut-off for inclusion in a component (cf. 
Tabachnick and Fidell 2001).
The PCA indicated three components explaining 25.4, 
11.6 and 8.6% of the variance. To confirm the number of 
components, a parallel analysis (Zwick and Velicer 1986) 
was conducted using software from Watkins (2000). Eigen-
values produced from a randomly generated data-set of the 
same size were compared with those from the PCA; if the 
values for the latter exceeded those from the former those 
components were retained for subsequent examination. The 
outcomes of this analysis indicated two components and 
the PCA was repeated to extract a two component solution. 
(See Table 2 for complete details of loadings and commu-
nalities, and Fig. 1 Supplementary Materials for the scree 
J Autism Dev Disord 
1 3
plot.) Component 1 corresponded to a social component 
with all six of the purported social items loading on this 
component, with loadings ranging from 0.70 to 0.36. Com-
ponent 2 corresponded to a physical component. All six of 
the purported physical items loaded on this component, 
with loadings ranging from 0.59 to 0.41, as did two items 
(party and bunnies) with loadings of 0.40 and 0.53, which 
also loaded on the social component, with loadings of 0.69 
and 0.36. Although these two items were not the most diffi-
cult, subjectively they appeared more complex in the sense 
that they were of longer duration and involved a greater 
number of conversational transitions between characters 
than did other items. Corrected item-total correlations for 
Components 1 and 2 ranged from 0.32 to 0.55 and 0.24 to 
0.40, respectively5. While the loading of two items on both 
components indicates that the social and cognitive items 
did not separate neatly into two completely independent 
components, the PCA provides a basis for concluding that 
the two sub-tests were tapping these two different aspects 
of functioning.
Discrimination Between Groups
Table  3 shows the means, 95% CIs, effect sizes and 95% 
CIs around those effect sizes for the various ToM sub-tests 
or scales administered to the two groups: that is, the 6-item 
5 Separate PCAs run on the six social and six physical items each 
identified a single component on which all six items’ loadings ranged 
from 0.51 to 0.74 and 0.43-0.62 for the social and physical sub-tests, 
respectively.
A-ToM social and physical sub-tests, the Strange Stories 
social and physical scales, and the Frith- Happé animations.
The CI and effect size statistics shown in Table 3 suggest 
that the ASD sample performed worse than the controls on 
the A-ToM social sub-test, with the group difference effect 
size much lower for the A-ToM physical sub-test. Given the 
(non-normal) distributional characteristics of the A-ToM 
social and physical scores (see Table 4), a binary logistic 
regression analysis examined whether, after controlling 
Table 2  Component matrix for PCA of the two components solution 
of the 12 A-ToM items
Major loadings above 0.32 are bolded
Item Factor pattern coefficients Communalities
Factor 1 Factor 2
Spaghetti 0.70 0.01 0.53
Party 0.69 0.40 0.53
Crying man 0.67 0.38 0.49
Burglar (glove) 0.65 0.21 0.42
Hat 0.62 0.15 0.39
Bunnies 0.36 0.53 0.33
Swimming 0.03 0.59 0.36
Lost glasses 0.17 0.56 0.31
Car 0.31 0.54 0.32
Light bulbs 0.01 0.54 0.31
Leg 0.20 0.51 0.26
Librarian 0.21 0.41 0.18
Table 3  Descriptive statistics for the various ToM scales for the 
ASD and non-ASD control sample
The maximum possible scores were 12 (for A-ToM social and physi-
cal), 16 (for Strange stories social and physical), 4 (for Frith-Happé 
animation categorization as random, goal directed and mental), and 8 
(for Frith-Happé animation feelings categorization)
Scale Group
ASD (N = 163) Non-ASD (N = 80)
A-ToM: Social
 Mean (& SD) 9.1 (2.4) 10.4 (1.5)
 95% CIs [8.7, 9.4] [10.1, 10.8]
 Cohen’s d (& 95% CIs) 0.64 [0.37, 0.92]
A-ToM: Physical
 Mean (& SD) 7.7 (2.7) 8.2 (2.5)
 95% CIs [7.3, 8.1] [7.7, 8.8]
 Cohen’s d (& 95% CIs) 0.22 [−0.05, 0.48]
Strange Stories: Social
 Social
  Mean (& SD) 12.1 (3.0) 14.1 (2.1)
  95% CIs [11.6, 12.5] [13.7, 14.6]
  Cohen’s d (& 95% CIs) 0.76 [0.48, 1.04]
Strange Stories: Physical
 Mean (& SD) 12.1 (3.0) 14.1 (2.1)
 95% CIs [11.7, 12.6] [13.2, 14.1]
 Cohen’s d (& 95% CIs) 0.54 [0.27, 0.81]
Smith-Happé animations
 Random
  Mean (& SD) 3.4 (0.85) 3.5 (0.67)
  95% CIs [3.3, 3.6] [3.4, 3.7]
  Cohen’s d (& 95% CIs) 0.13 [−0.14, 0.39]
Goal directed
 Mean (& SD) 2.5 (1.0) 2.5 (1.1)
 95% CIs [2.3, 2.6] [2.3, 2.7]
 Cohen’s d (& 95% CIs) 0.06 [−0.21, 0.33]
Mental
 Mean (& SD) 2.7 (1.2) 3.1 (1.0)
 95% CIs [2.5, 2.8] [3.0, 3.3]
 Cohen’s d (& 95% CIs) 0.39 [0.13, 0.67]
Feelings Categorization
 Mean (& SD) 3.7 (2.2) 4.5 (1.9)
 95% CIs [3.4, 4.0] [4.1, 4.9]
 Cohen’s d (& 95% CIs) 0.39 [0.13, 0.67]
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for VCI at Step 1, the A-ToM social score predicted group 
membership (i.e., ASD vs. control). A series of identi-
cal analyses were also conducted with A-ToM physical, 
Strange Stories Social and Strange Stories Physical individ-
ually substituted for A-ToM social. Table 5 summarizes the 
outcomes of these analyses (B, standard error of B, degrees 
of freedom, p value, Odds ratio or Exp (B) and Nagelkerke 
 R2.
After controlling for VCI, the A-ToM social score sig-
nificantly predicted group membership, with each one-unit 
increase on the A-ToM social scale increasing the odds of 
being classified as a control group member by a factor of 
1.38. The corresponding analysis using the A-ToM physical 
score showed no significant prediction of group member-
ship beyond that provide by VCI. In sum, although verbal 
IQ clearly contributed to group differences (see Table  5), 
the A-ToM social, but not the physical, sub-test discrimi-
nated the ASD from the non-ASD sample, thereby meeting 
one of the expectations for the instrument. Note that WASI-
II PRI did not contribute to prediction of group member-
ship, as was expected given the matching of groups on PRI, 
B=-0.020, SE = 0.011, df = 1, p = .087, Exp (B) = 0.981, CI 
[0.959–1.003].
Following a reviewer’s suggestion that the ability to 
understand more complex language (cf. Happé 1995) 
– perhaps as indexed by the vocabulary (or similarities) 
component of the WASI-II – may underpin ToM task per-
formance, we ran two separate logistic regressions using 
vocabulary and similarities instead of VCI at step 1. In both 
cases, the results (available from the authors)–in terms of 
patterns of statistical significance, variance explained and 
odds ratios–were virtually identical to the results described 
above for VCI.
Table  5 shows the distributions of scores on the two 
A-ToM sub-tests for each group, with these data providing 
the first large-sample indication of the degree of overlap on 
Table 4  Logistic regression 
summary statistics for 
prediction of group membership 
by VCI (Step 1) and either 
A-ToM social, A-ToM physical, 
Strange Stories social or Strange 
Stories physical (Step 2)
Statistic
Analysis & Predictor variable B SE df p Exp (B) Exp (B) 95% CIs Nagelkerke R2
VCI 0.027 0.011 1 0.012 1.028 [1.006, 1.050] 0.092
A-ToM social 0.325 0.095 1 0.001 1.384 [1.149, 1.665] 0.169
VCI 0.037 0.010 1 0.000 1.038 [1.017, 1.059] 0.092
A-ToM physical 0.041 0.056 1 0.471 1.04 [0.933, 1.163] 0.095
VCI 0.019 0.011 1 0.089 1.019 [0.007, 1.042] 0.092
Strange Stories social 0.381 0.092 1 0.000 1.463 [1.223, 1.751] 0.214
VCI 0.025 0.011 1 0.026 1.025 [1.003, 1.048] 0.087
Strange Stories physical 0.161 0.068 1 0.018 1.175 [1.028, 1.343] 0.120
Table 5  Number of 
participants (and cumulative 
proportion) obtaining each 
score on the A-ToM social and 
physical scales for the ASD and 
non-ASD control sample
Scale & Group Score
Social 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
ASD
 Frequency 0 1 2 4 3 4 10 13 18 17 36 40 15
 ProportionCum 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.15 0.23 0.34 0.44 0.66 0.91 1
Non-ASD
 Frequency 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 3 9 22 26 18
 ProportionCum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.18 0.45 0.78 1
Physical
 ASD
 Frequency 0 1 4 6 11 16 15 18 28 22 15 12 10
 ProportionCum 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.13 0.23 0.33 0.44 0.61 0.74 0.83 0.91 1
Non-ASD
 Frequency 1 0 0 2 2 5 12 6 10 13 15 9 5
 ProportionCum 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.13 0.28 0.35 0.48 0.64 0.83 0.94 1
J Autism Dev Disord 
1 3
a ToM measure between ASD and non-ASD adult samples. 
Although some participants in both groups were close to or 
at ceiling on the social sub-test, this pattern was less marked 
for the ASD participants. Moreover, extremely low social 
scores were more prevalent for ASD participants. In other 
words, there were clear group differences but there was 
also marked variability within groups. Again, these patterns 
were not evident on the A-ToM physical sub-test. Interest-
ingly, the respective correlations between the A-ToM social 
and physical sub-tests and the AQ50, which we used as a 
filler task, were −0.004 and −0.045, respectively, for the 
ASD sample, suggesting that it is unlikely the A-ToM was 
simply reflecting (self-reported) autism severity.
For the Strange Stories, the CI and effect size patterns 
for the social sub-test were similar in nature to those for the 
A-ToM, with the two groups clearly differentiated on the 
social sub-test. The VCI did not predict group membership 
but, after controlling for VCI, the Strange Stories social 
score did, with each increase of one-unit on the social scale 
increasing the odds of being classified as a control group 
member by a factor of 1.46. In contrast with the A-ToM, 
the corresponding analysis using the A-ToM physical score 
did significantly predict group membership after control-
ling for VCI, with the odds of classification as a control 
group member rising by a factor of 1.18 with each one-unit 
physical scale score increase. Thus, for the Strange Stories, 
even after removing VCI, group membership was differen-
tiated by both the social and physical sub-tests rather than 
by the social sub-test alone, a finding which undermines 
the discriminative capacity of the Strange Stories for adult 
samples.
For the Frith- Happé animations, the other instru-
ment included to examine convergent validity, the effect 
size indices shown in Table 3 suggest small group differ-
ences, in the expected directions, on the mental and feel-
ings categorization (but not the random or goal-directed) 
scales. However, the effects were relatively weak and one 
way ANOVAs, with VCI as a covariate, on each of these 
scales did not reveal significant main effects for group, F 
(1, 236) = 0.01–3.80, p = .053-0.94, partial η2 = 0.00–0.02. 
Again, however, VCI contributed significantly for each 
variable, F (1, 236) = 5.37–22.42, p = .00–-0.02, η2 = 
0.02–0.09.
As well as requiring the two groups to be distinguished 
on the A-ToM social, but not the physical, sub-test, we pre-
dicted that the three self-report scales of empathy from the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis 1983) and the mini-
SPIN screener for generalized social anxiety disorder (Con-
nor et al. 2001) would show group differences and yet not 
be meaningfully related to the A-ToM social scores (i.e., 
discriminant validity). On the perspective taking, empathic 
concern and personal distress sub-scales of the Interper-
sonal Reactivity Index, the ASD sample performed worse6: 
that is, they were less likely to report taking the psychologi-
cal perspective of others and expressing concern for others 
in difficulty, and more likely to report being distressed over 
problematic interactions with others, t 
(235–241) = 2.67–6.94, p < .001. They also reported signif-
icantly higher levels of social anxiety, t (240) = 5.57, 
p < .001. (Supplementary Materials Table  3 shows the 
means, 95% CIs, effect sizes and CIs around those effect 
sizes for these various scales for the two groups). Yet, as 
hypothesized, there were no significant relationships 
between any of these four measures and the A-ToM social 
scale, −0.01 < r < .13. (The full correlation matrices for 
ASD, control and combined samples are provided in Sup-
plementary Materials Table 4.) Nor were there any signifi-
cant relationships between these scales and the other ToM 
measures used to examine convergent validity (see below).
Convergent Validity
Tables  6, 7 and 8 show the inter-correlations between 
the A-ToM social and physical sub-tests and other ToM 
measures, namely, the Strange Stories social and physical 
6 When VCI was entered as a covariate in a between-groups 
ANOVA, it had no meaningful effect on any of these measured, with 
all F values < 1.
Table 6  Inter-correlations of 
A-ToM scales with other ToM 
measures and WASI-II verbal 
and performance IQ for ASD 
sample
*p < .05, **p < .01 (2-tailed)
Measure 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
1. A-ToM social – 0.42** 0.58** 0.53** 0.22** 0.34** 0.38** 0.12
2. A-ToM physical – 0.37** 0.61** 0.14 0.29** 0.33** 0.20**
3. SS social – 0.62** 0.18* 0.27** 0.46** 0.18*
4. SS physical – 0.16* 0.31** 0.56** 0.25**
5. Frith-Happé mental – 0.79** 0.21** 0.26**
6. Frith-Happé feeling – 0.33** 0.20**
7. WASI-II VCI – 0.39**
8. WASI-II PRI –
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sub-tests and the Frith- Happé animations mental and 
feelings categorization scales for the ASD, non-ASD 
and combined samples, respectively. In the ASD sample 
the expected positive relationships emerged between the 
A-ToM social sub-test and the other ToM measures, as 
did the relationship between the A-ToM and Strange Sto-
ries physical sub-tests. For the control sample, the A-ToM 
social and physical sub-tests correlated significantly with 
the corresponding Strange Stories sub-tests, though no rela-
tionships were detected for the Frith- Happé animations 
mental and feelings categorizations scales, likely due to 
range restriction on both variables. Note also that, for the 
ASD sample, there were significant and meaningful cor-
relations between all ToM sub-tests and the IQ measures. 
As Tables 6, 7 and 8 shows, the trend was for correlations 
with VCI to be a little stronger than for PRI, and for the 
social-VCI correlation to be a little stronger for the Strange 
Stories than for the A-ToM.
Discussion
Building on prior research using the Strange Stories test, 
our objective was to develop a standardized, reliable and 
valid ToM measure that could be administered in no more 
than half an hour, would require participants to interpret 
interpersonal interactions as they play out and without 
the benefit of extended reflection, and yet still sample the 
social and physical content domains adequately. Following 
a process of item-analysis designed to reduce the original 
17-item social item pool to items that (a) were more dif-
ficult for ASD than non-ASD individuals (but not at ceiling 
or floor accuracy levels), and (b) showed strong discrimi-
nation of good and poor performers with acceptable cor-
relations with the total score, we identified six social items. 
These included three based on items contained in previous 
measures and three new items. The physical item pool was 
resolved by simply eliminating two items from the eight-
item pool that did not correlate with the total score. Given 
the item selection criteria, the net result was a social sub-
test that differentiated ASD and non-ASD participants. In 
contrast, the physical sub-test met expectations in that it did 
not differentiate the two groups. Importantly, the differen-
tiation on the social scale was maintained after controlling 
for verbal IQ, despite clear differences in VCI between the 
two groups and a significant relationship between VCI and 
the A-ToM social scale.
The data also provided an indication of the extent and 
variability of ToM deficits in adults with ASD which to 
date has been lacking in the absence of a psychometrically 
Table 7  Inter-correlations of 
A-ToM scales with other ToM 
measures and WASI-II verbal 
and performance IQ for non-
ASD sample
*p < .05, **p < .01 (2-tailed)
Measure 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
1. A-ToM social – 0.27* 0.50** 0.41** 0.17 0.12 0.20 0.07
2. A-ToM physical – 0.24* 0.42** 0.10 0.08 −0.07 0.07
3. SS social – 0.58* 0.04 0.11 0.10 0.22
4. SS physical – 0.09 0.12 0.21 0.17
5. Frith-Happé mental – 0.80** 0.22 0.20
6. Frith-Happé feeling – 0.22 0.28*
7. WASI-II VCI – 0.21
8. WASI-II PRI –
Table 8  Inter-correlations 
of A-ToM scales with other 
ToM measures and WASI-II 
verbal and performance IQ for 
ASD and non-ASD samples 
combined
SS social Strange Stories social, SS physical Strange Stories physical, Frith-Happé mental Frith-Happé 
mental state categorization, Frith-Happé feeling Frith-Happé feeling categorization, WASI-II VCI WASI-II 
verbal comprehension index, WASI-II PRI WASI-II perceptual reasoning index
*p < .05, **p < .01 (2-tailed)
Measure 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
1. A-ToM social – 0.42** 0.60* 0.54** 0.25** 0.33** 0.39** 0.08
2. A-ToM physical – 0.35** 0.56** 0.14* 0.24** 0.23** 0.16*
3. SS social – 0.64** 0.19** 0.28** 0.42** 0.15*
4. SS physical – 0.18** 0.30** 0.50** 0.20**
5. Frith-Happé mental – 0.80** 0.25** 0.22**
6. Frith-Happé feeling – 0.33** 0.20**
7. WASI-II VCI – 0.30**
8. WASI-II PRI –
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robust measure of ToM. Despite the clear group differen-
tiation on the A-ToM social scale, the variability in ToM 
performance within the ASD sample was substantial. 
Some individuals clearly had little difficulty interpreting 
the social interactions accurately; others were quite mark-
edly impaired. Thus, while a ToM deficit may be indica-
tive of ASD in adults, the lack of one (at least as detected 
on an instrument such as the A-ToM) may not preclude a 
diagnosis. If indeed this proved to be the case it would call 
into question whether a ToM deficit should be considered a 
core feature of the disorder (at least in adulthood). Further, 
while one may expect this deficit to be related to autism 
severity, the lack of a relationship with the AQ scale sug-
gests this may not be the case.
The examination of reliability and validity confirmed the 
potential of the ToM measurement instrument. Inter-rater 
and test–retest reliability were acceptable, especially given 
the interval between tests. Principal components analysis 
confirmed the presence of relatively neat social and physi-
cal components. Additionally, with the benefit of a much 
larger sample size than has previously been used in this area 
of research, the other measures of ToM–the Strange Stories 
and the Frith-Happé animations–did not show the same dif-
ferentiation between ASD and non-ASD adults that was 
exhibited on the A-ToM. On the Strange Stories, the groups 
were clearly differentiated on the social scale–but they 
were also differentiated on the physical scale and the differ-
entiation on both scales persisted after controlling for VCI. 
Although the ASD group performed worse on the mental 
and feelings measures of the Frith-Happé animations, the 
effect sizes were relatively weak and the differences were 
not significant with VCI controlled. It is important to note, 
of course, that the Strange Stories and the Frith-Happé ani-
mations have not been the beneficiaries of any item analysis 
approach such as that carried out here with the A-ToM, nor 
could they have been given the limited sample sizes in their 
supporting studies. It is conceivable that a similar approach 
to producing a final item set on those scales could produce 
instruments that provide the same differentiation, although 
our data suggest that the number of items preserved in such 
a revision would likely be quite small.
Other indicators of convergent and discriminant valid-
ity were detected. First, there were significant correlations 
between the A-ToM scales and the corresponding scales 
from the Strange Stories and the Frith-Happé animations. 
Second, the expected group differences emerged on the 
empathy and social anxiety scales of the Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index and the mini-SPIN, yet these measures 
were uncorrelated with the A-ToM social scale.
Our examination of the psychometric characteristics of 
the A-ToM was based on adult sample sizes far larger than 
used in any previous ToM instrument work in this area. Our 
data suggest that the instrument has considerable potential 
for use with ASD adults as a pointer to the types of deficits 
that may constrain the adaptiveness of their social interac-
tions in a variety of situations. Moreover, the characteris-
tics of the stimuli are such that examinees are likely to per-
ceive the scenarios as realistic (i.e., as having face validity, 
although we did not formally assess this), thereby provid-
ing a plausible starting point for client-clinician discussions 
about the nuances of social interaction and the interpreta-
tion of the interpersonal behaviors of others. And, as we 
noted earlier, it would be possible for researchers to use the 
stimuli in conjunction with potential indicators of underly-
ing processes such as response latency or eye tracking.
Despite these positives we believe that it will be cru-
cial for subsequent work to pursue a number of important 
follow-up questions. First, although our sample of adult 
ASD participants far outnumbered those reported in the 
literature to date, it is obviously not large enough to pro-
vide normative data partitioned by factors such as age and 
gender. Second, the scenarios used were all presented as 
relatively short duration, discrete stimuli. This means, of 
course, that we are unable to comment on how individu-
als might respond when they have much more contextual 
information about the characters they are observing. It is 
possible that more prolonged exposure to the individuals 
depicted in scenarios might allow individuals with ASD to 
learn how to read the behaviors of others. Alternatively, it 
may simply accentuate the gap between ASD and non-ASD 
adults. Such information would, of course, indicate if these 
skills can be learned through extensive exposure and pro-
vide potentially important information from an intervention 
perspective.
Third, the A-ToM is a general measure in the sense that 
the items require observers to interpret a range of different 
categories of behaviors (e.g., faux pas, sarcasm), with these 
categories mirroring the focus of earlier work in this area. 
But, just as our sample showed considerable variability in 
their global performance, so may it be that adults with ASD 
have specific deficits (or strengths) in ToM, a possibility 
canvassed extensively by Brewer and Young (2015). Some 
individuals may have a particular problem interpreting sar-
casm, others may struggle with faux pas or metaphors or 
bluff. And, it will likely be difficult (perhaps impossible) 
to tease out which of these problems reflect difficulties in 
decoding the social intent of others vs. some more specific 
linguistic impairment. In other words, to understand the 
ToM deficits of individuals with ASD we may well need to 
undertake much more systematic probing of specific areas 
of ToM. This is an area that we are actively pursuing via 
the development of larger item banks that tap into such 
areas.
Fourth, while our validation efforts included an exami-
nation of the structure of the instrument and various 
aspects of convergent and discriminant validity, a major 
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objective now should be to examine the relationship 
between A-ToM test performance and completely inde-
pendent criterion-related measures of social-cognitive 
functioning. At present, the broader functional signifi-
cance of the ToM deficits suggested by such tests as the 
A-ToM and the Strange Stories is assumed, or sometimes 
inferred from clinical observation, rather than empirically 
demonstrated. Consequently, the nexus between specific 
areas or levels of severity of ToM deficit and the indi-
vidual’s day-today functioning in specific areas, or indeed 
autism severity, is poorly understood. It is of course pos-
sible that future research that proceeds in this direction 
will reveal that a global measure like the A-ToM ade-
quately predicts the severity of any area of ToM deficit 
and a broad range of difficulties that an individual with 
ASD may experience in daily life. But, equally, such 
research may show an urgent need for much more precise 
or targeted measures of ToM and for an examination of 
its impact on adaptive skills.
Finally, there are of course fundamental theoretical 
issues to be resolved. As we indicated at the outset, vari-
ous other mechanisms have been posited as crucial for 
understanding the social interaction impairments seen in 
ASD (e.g., deficits in processing facial and vocal emotion 
expressions, pragmatic aspects of language, executive 
functioning deficits.) Some may prove to be manifesta-
tions of a ToM deficit and some may emerge as independ-
ent core deficits. A substantial research effort will be 
required to elucidate the independent and interactive con-
tributions of such factors, with the answers quite likely 
having implications for the structure of measurement 
instruments such as that described in this study.
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